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Abstract—Cloud federation is a novel concept that has been
drawing attention from research and industry. However, there
is a lack of solid proposal that can be widely adopted in practice
to guarantee adequate governance of federations, especially in
the Public Sector contexts due to legal requirements.
In this paper, we propose an innovative governance approach
that ensures distributed and democratic control in cloud feder-
ations. Starting from FaaS, a recent cloud federation proposal,
we propose a blockchain infrastructure for the federation
registry that implements the proposed governance approach.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing proliferation of cloud systems raises new
issues, particularly on the interconnectivity and cooperation
of already deployed clouds. Organisations are looking for
appropriate solutions to create a ﬂexible aggregation of cloud
systems, which can be formed dynamically by different
individual clouds that cooperate to achieve speciﬁc business
goals. Indeed, the underlying motivations can be multiple.
Among these, sharing of computing resources, controlled us-
age of third-party services or data, collaboration among en-
tities belonging to different administrative domains. Hence,
cloud aggregation leads the constituent clouds to achieve
goals that were not possible to achieve otherwise.
A prominent proposal for cloud aggregation is cloud
federation [1], [2], [3]. It is a recent concept that allows
services from different cloud providers to be aggregated in a
single pool. However, there is no widely accepted proposal
that organisations can adopt, and the few available lacks
of adequate governance solutions: all federation members
should be a network of peers equally concurring to their
governance. Indeed, collusion of outacting members can
cause the forgery of malicious data, thereby compromising,
e.g., the integrity of the federation or the achievement of
its goals. These deﬁciencies are more compelling in the
European Public Sector, where public administrations are
forced to adopt cloud interoperability solutions according to
the new European Digital Single Market agenda.
In response to this need, as part of the European project
SUNFISH (http://www.sunﬁshproject.eu/), we are contribut-
ing to design and implement an innovative cloud federation
solution, called Federation-as-a-Service (FaaS) [4]. Based on
the experience gathered within SUNFISH and collaborations
with public administrations, this paper proposes a pioneering
governance for FaaS that can lead to its wide-scale adoption
in the Public Sector.
Our governance proposal is ﬁrstly based on the distributed
control of data: all members have a consistent copy of data
that cannot be corrupted by any means. Secondly, on the
democratic control of governance actions: the federation
is ruled according to consensus criteria ensuring that the
rights of each member cannot be violated due to collusion
of others. Finally, on trustworthy data services: access
and sharing data services (e.g., access control and data
anonymisation) must be protected to avoid conﬁdentiality
and integrity attacks [5]. It is worth noticing that the term
democratic is used to reﬂect the direct participation and
control of the federation by its members, in a way similar
to a direct democracy, and carries no deeper meaning.
To implement this governance, we propose here a ﬁrst
exploitation of blockchain technology [6] as an infras-
tructure to build the federation registry underlying FaaS.
Blockchain is a novel technology that, besides its application
to cryptocurrency, features fascinating properties concerning
integrity, distribution and control of data. More speciﬁcally,
we utilise so-called smart-contracts, i.e. programs deployed
and executed autonomously on blockchain.
The blockchain-based registry offers a set of core func-
tionalities upon which our governance proposal is built.
A preliminary implementation has been realised by using
Ethereum (https://www.ethereum.org/). To the best of our
knowledge, this is the ﬁrst proposal to use blockchain to
support a cloud federation, both to carry out the federation
governance and to strengthen the trustworthiness of security
services. On the face of it, FaaS appears to be the ﬁrst
blockchain-based cloud architecture of its denomination.
Paper Structure. Section II illustrates our governance pro-
posal. Section III outlines FaaS. Section IV introduces the
blockchain-based registry infrastructure. Section V discusses
on it. Section VI concludes and touches upon future works.
II. A NEW CLOUD FEDERATION GOVERNANCE
In this section, we synthesise and articulate an innovative
governance for cloud federations that ensures distributed and
democratic control of the federation, and strengthens the
trustworthiness of security-preserving services.
The creation of a cloud federation is triggered by a
business goal shared among the participating clouds. The
cooperation of clouds to achieve the goal should be a
priori deﬁned to ensure that the governance is carried out
with the consensus of all members. The cornerstone of the
governance must be a business contract [3], which reports
the types of services to be federated, the guaranteed SLA
and the actions to be taken to rule the federation.
A key driver for the adoption of any cloud federation,
especially in the European Public Sector, is the absence of
a centralised governance. As a matter of fact, among differ-
ent public administrations being federation members, there
cannot be a designated leader (i.e., there is no primus inter
pares), rather federation members must form a network of
peers. To this aim, we identify the following key objectives
to achieve a fully distributed governance
• distributed data, the governance data is consistently
distributed among all the federation members; and
• democratic control, all federation members have the
same obligations and rights, i.e. the same capacity of
triggering and performing a governance action.
Achieving such objectives would ensure that any governance
action, e.g. the enforcement of access control policies, is
carried out with the consensus of all the members.
To ensure that these objectives are continuously guaran-
teed, the federation governance must secure the provisioning
and sharing of federated service and data. Indeed, the
accountability of all security-preserving functionalities of the
federation (e.g., access control and data anonymisation) is
of paramount importance. Therefore, the governance has to
provide adequate means to ensure
• trustworthy data services, i.e. protecting services from
conﬁdentiality and integrity violation attacks.
A cloud participating to such a federation will be relieved
from any additional security management task and enjoy
advanced security-preserving functionalities.
To realise this distributed, democratic and trustworthy
governance, it is needed a distributed infrastructure that,
on one hand, ensures strong integrity and conﬁdentiality
guarantees of data and, on the other hand, supports the non-
repudiable enforcement of the business contract.
III. FAAS: A CLOUD FEDERATION SOLUTION
To address the need of cloud interoperability, the
SUNFISH project has proposed Federation-as-a-Service
(FaaS) [4], a new cloud federation solution. It amounts to
a service for clouds that enables the secure creation and
management of cloud federations.
FaaS is implemented via the SUNFISH software platform
depicted in Figure 1; the description of its components
follow. Most of all, the platform is conceived to be deployed
in a distributed manner on top of all members, thus to avoid
any centralised control and component.
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Figure 1. FaaS: Software Platform
The DS component offers a state-of-the-art attribute-based
access control system distributed across all the member
clouds [7]. By relying on the expressiveness of attributes,
which are provided by a federated identity manager (IDM),
the DS is transparently connected with security-preserving
data sharing services: data anonymisation (ANM) and mask-
ing (DM), and secure data computation service (SMC).
Speciﬁcally, data masking and anonymisation services are
used, respectively, to ensure the privacy of sensitive datasets
to be stored and released.
The inter-cloud interactions, controlled by the DS, are
monitored by the FRM [8] via a distributed set of probes,
and audited ofﬂine by the FSA.
The IWM and FAM are in charge of managing tenants
by providing optimised workload strategies and SLA mon-
itoring. Finally, the RI is the logical entry-point to the un-
derlying blockchain-based infrastructure implementing the
federation registry and realising the proposed governance.
IV. A BLOCKCHAIN INFRASTRUCTURE FOR CLOUD
FEDERATIONS
To realise the FaaS federation registry and the proposed
governance, we introduce here the use of a blockchain
system featuring smart-contracts, both to store data and to
offer computational resources.
The advantages of using blockchain amount to the strong
integrity guarantees of the stored data and of the non-
repudiable, persistence of smart-contract executions. Due to
the replication of data on blockchain, the service availability
is also always guaranteed.
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Figure 2. Blockchain Infrastructure and its interaction with FaaS platform components (Coloured boxes are components from Figure 1)
A. Functionality
The blockchain infrastructure implements the proposed
governance by offering the following functionalities.
Federation Contract: It offers the storage of the busi-
ness contract and the contract signature of each federation
member. According to the needs, it supports the evaluation
of precise metrics to evaluate the contract rules.
Federated Services: It offers up-to-date snapshots of
the whole federation state, thus to correctly manage the
allocation of and access to available services.
Access Control and SLA policies: It stores access con-
trol and SLA policies concerning provisioning of federated
services. It also supports administration actions on policies.
Data Sharing Services: Although security-preserving
techniques are proven individually secure, various studies
(see, e.g., [5]) show that they can be circumvented, e.g.
by linkage attacks. Thus, this functionality offers supporting
functions for strengthening their reliability.
Federation Monitoring: It stores and processes logs
gathered by the access control monitoring system.
B. Architecture
The infrastructure consists of a private blockchain system
shared among multiple FaaS federations. Each federation has
its own smart-contracts, one for each of the functionality, and
relies on RIs to interact with them.
Focussing on a single federation, the infrastructure and
its interaction can be represented as in Figure 2. Indeed, the
platform components willing to use a functionality interacts
via the APIs of the RI1. In its own turn, the RI invokes the
corresponding smart-contracts with the given parameters and
returns the received outputs. Push notiﬁcations are also sup-
ported to allow multiple side-effects of single invocations.
The architectural design based on API fully decouples the
functionalities from the speciﬁc software used to implement
the smart-contract blockchain. Additionally, exploiting one
1https://github.com/sunﬁsh-prj/SUNFISH-Platform-API/tree/master/
RegistryInterfaceAPI
infrastructure for multiple federations has signiﬁcant advan-
tages. On the one hand, the more the nodes of the blockchain
network are, the higher the integrity and availability guar-
antees are. On the other hand, as the infrastructure is stan-
dalone, new federations can be built upon by only setting up
the needed contracts and their access parameters. Obviously,
every RI can only access its federation data: a trusted
computing platform is used to store a federation membership
token needed for interacting with smart-contracts.
C. Implementation
A preliminary implementation of the blockchain-based
registry for FaaS is based on Ethereum. Other blockchain
solutions, e.g. Hyperledger (https://www.hyperledger.org/),
could be similarly used. In the rest, we comment on the
smart-contracts implementing some of the functionalities.
1) Data Sharing Services: This functionality concerns
the security enhancements offered to the data masking and
anonymisation services. To the former, it offers a reliable
storage to secure the masking ingredients. To the latter, it
prevents on the ﬂy the degradation of ensured privacy levels.
Data masking. As shown in Figure 2, a masking table
is generated and used by the DM to carry out the data
(un)masking process. To avoid a centralised, untrustworthy
storage of the table, we rely on a smart-contract. Speciﬁcally,
the table is ﬁrst encrypted with the public key of the party
authorised to access the table. Then, it is divided into chucks
and stored, together with the masking table identiﬁer, via a
smart-contract. Hence, the authorised party can download
the table, decrypt it and unmask the data.
Anonymisation. The ANM offers, among others, a differ-
ential privacy [9] service for obfuscating sensitive datasets
before release. To avoid linkage attacks that will degrade
the privacy level of already released datasets, we rely on a
smart-contract. It stores a privacy budget that (i) controls the
amount of noise generated in the obfuscation; (ii) evaluates
on the ﬂy data release queries; (iii) adapts the used differen-
tial privacy parameters. As outlined in Listing 1, the contract
Listing 1
DATA QUERY RECORD (‘query’ is a data structure)
contract QueryRecord{
struct record {
string dataset_id;
unit budget;
mapping (unit => query) queries;
}
mapping (string => record) queryRecord;
function evalQuery(query param) public returns (...){
uint requestedBdgt = evalBudget(param);
if (queryRecord[param.name].budget > = requestedBdgt)
//query authorised, return differential privacy
parameters, update remaining budget
else
//query not authorised
}
}
maintains, via the data structure record, all the information
on managed datasets. When a new query arrives, the function
evalQuery checks the query parameters according to the
available budget and provides the appropriate information
to tune the release; the budget is then updated accordingly.
2) Access Control Monitoring: The distributed set of
probes of FRM [8] are used to intercept and monitor inter-
cloud interactions. The sensed logs are stored and evaluated
by means of smart-contracts. Speciﬁcally, they perform
semantics checks on the attributes forming access requests
and on how the distributed DS components operate to carry
out the distributed authorisation process.
Additionally, these checks are paired with off-chain, in-
tensive checks on the policy evaluation process; this policy
analyser is developed by using the formal framework in [10].
V. DISCUSSION
The proposed governance needs no trusted-third-party
to base a federation upon. Hence, there is no single-
point-of-failure and it advocates the democratic control and
enforcement of the federation business contract, thus to
avoid collusion attacks against federation members. This is
realised by exploiting a blockchain-based registry.
The registry is also used to improve the security of the
whole federation. In fact, on the one hand, it mitigates well-
known vulnerabilities of data sharing services and, most
of all, it ensures the availability of services. On the other
hand, it puts in place the ingredients to support decentralised
runtime monitoring of the federation.
It is also worth mentioning that we are aware of typical
disadvantages of blockchain (i.e., limited speed, limited
computing resources, possible scalability issues, etc.), but
some preliminary research activities we carried out [11]
exempliﬁed that a balance between security guarantees and
performance can be achieved. It is there introduced a layered
blockchain deployment which anchors a fast blockchain, e.g.
Hyperledger, to a slow one in order to enhance the overall
security, while offering adequate performance.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a blockchain infras-
tructure for implementing a cloud federation registry and
realising an innovative governance for cloud federations. The
distributed and democratic governance properties ensured
by this blockchain-based solution will pave the way to a
wider adoption of cloud federation solutions, especially in
the Public Sector.
In future, we plan to ﬁnalise the implementation of the in-
frastructure and to introduce new governance functionalities
like, e.g., a reliable reputation system.
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